INTRODUCTION

Background
Colombia has been involved in an internal conflict since 1949 following the assassination of the popular liberal political leader, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan. Afterward, the two radical political parties, liberals and conservatives, began a bloody struggle that grew systematically. order to sustain its capability and structure. In the late 1980s, the guerrilla movement began to employ drug trafficking and kidnapping to finance their activities: They gradually lost their core ideology and became a narco terrorist organization. In the late 1990s, the FARC achieved numerous successes in attacking and defeating isolated battalion-sized units of the Colombian Army. During this period, the FARC transitioned from a war of movement to a war of position and the Government Armed Forces were not prepared for this transition. When Alvaro Uribe Velez assumed the presidency of Colombia in 2002, he developed the Democratic Defense and Security Policy Democratic Defense and Security Policy (DDSP), which for the first time involved all of elements of national power to fight narco-terrorism. One of the achievements of the DDSP was an increase in military capabilities, especially in end strength, equipment and intelligence. With this increase in military capabilities, the state was able to provide better security in the entire country, further enabling local authorities to reestablish control and influence.
Besides being able to provide security for the population and infrastructure, the Colombian Armed Forces began a series of military campaigns that resulted in the death of some key FARC leaders and the reduction of their guerrilla communications network. These campaigns forced the FARC to move towards the border areas, especially in the south and east of Colombia. In order to show that they retained military capability, the FARC conducted some small level attacks on isolated military and police units and terrorist attacks on urban areas. By the end of President Uribe's first term in 2006, the military and police forces had reduced the influence and capabilities of the terrorists. In 2006, Alvaro Uribe was elected for his second term, and one of his most important issues was to continue the DDSP. His Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos was in charge of developing a policy to consolidate the achievement form the prior policy. Juan Manuel Santos, "Policy for the consolidation of democratic security" (Government Policy, Bogotá, Colombia, 2007), 31. In 2007, the Colombian Ministry of Defense established the Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security (PCDS). This "Consolidation Strategy" consisted of three phases to continue the fight against all terrorist organizations (see fig 1) . The first is the territorial control phase. This phase was implemented in zones where illegal armed groups, drug trafficking structures, and criminal bands were still active, and in zones where illegal self-defense groups had demobilized 3 The second phase, which is the focus of this monograph, is the stabilization phase. This phase is to be implemented in those zones where the Colombian military had established the requisite conditions from phase one. The objective is to establish security conditions in order to begin the process of institutional recovery. This phase is oriented on satisfying the local population's most basic, immediate needs through state democratic institutions, agencies, while military, and police forces continued to maintain order, security, and peaceful co-existence in the community.
. This phase is offensively and defensively oriented in order to neutralize all criminal organizations, break up drug trafficking networks and protect the state infrastructure in the zones.
The third and final phase is the consolidation phase and is oriented on those regions where the state was performing its security duties. Efforts in the third phase would be oriented on the political, economic, and social elements of national power while the military and police forces would continue to maintain the underlying security conditions An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.
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This definition is important and should be the basis for the Colombian military definition because it represents the latest doctrine in stability operations of one of the most experienced military forces in these operations, the U. S. Military. The U.S. has conducted stability operations in different countries of the world, and today it is currently executing them in Iraq and Afghanistan with a high degree of success. Based on Colombian legal considerations for the employment of military forces, stability operations might be defined as those military missions, tasks, and activities conducted by the Colombian Military Forces in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. This definition involves the objectives established by the third phase of the PCDS.
The "Consolidation Strategy" states that security force operations must continue to contribute to a climate of confidence and stability that will attract private investment and produce economic growth and social development, reducing unemployment and poverty. The PCDS has gained important achievements by the employment of the military forces in offensive operations against all internal threats. Military operations have reduced terrorist actions against the population and limited their economic support. (see fig 2) .
With the establishment of security, conditions are set for state social action to benefit the entire populace. Further, military doctrine must define the military's role in the process. By integrating stability operations in military doctrine and then execute those operations greater government synergy might be achieved. As stated in US Army doctrine, stability operations are part of Full Spectrum Operations 6 , and may complement and reinforce offensive, defensive, and support operations, or they may be the decisive operation. They may take place before, during, or after offensive, defensive, and support operations. 7 Colombian Ministry of Defense, Logros De La Política De Consolidación De La Seguridad Democrática, (Bogotá, Colombia, 2010), 12-50 Establishing Colombian stability operations doctrine based on successful U.S. doctrine, and modified by the Colombian environment and experience, could create synergy in the Colombian government's efforts towards meeting the needs of security and state governance.
Colombian Military should integrate stability operations across the government through joint and interagency efforts. The importance of stability operations is more noticeable in current conflicts not only in Colombia but also those faced by U.S. and Coalition Forces. Today's conflicts are among the population and not only against a well-structured and defined enemy. The essence of stability operations is the safety and security it provides to a beleaguered populace. Executing stability operations will support the restoration of basic public order and a semblance of normalcy and time to rebuild the institutions of government and market economy that provide the foundations for enduring peace and stability. 
Methodology
In order to establish whether or not the Colombian Armed Forces should conduct stability operations in its internal conflict against terrorist groups, this monograph discusses how stability operations are applicable to Colombian counter-terrorism efforts through examinations of 
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
Colombian Political Constitution
The constitución política de Colombia (Colombian Political Constitution) is the highest legal document in Colombia. It establishes the rights and mandates for every citizen. For the purpose of this monograph, the focus will be on Articles 216, 217 and 250 that establish the roles of the Armed Forces. Article 216 states "The Public Force will be comprised exclusively by the Armed Forces and National Police. All Colombians are mandated to take up arms when public needs require it to defend national independence and public institutions."
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Article 217 provides the Public Force's mission. It states in part that, the nation will maintain for its defense permanent military forces made up of the army, navy, and air force. The armed forces will have as their primary purpose the defense of the sovereignty, independence, and integrity of the national territory and of the constitutional order.
This article defines the Public Force as consisting of the Armed Forces and National Police. According to Article 216, the primary role of the Armed Forces is to defend national independence from foreign aggression seeking to subjugate or control its territory. However, following this line, the Article states that the Armed Forces are also to defend public institutions. This part of the Article is one of particular interest for this monograph. Public institutions are all of the legal, constitutional institutions that provide governance capability to a country. A critical task is to defend these institutions not only from foreign threats to sovereignty but also from local threats to internal stability, which can weaken sovereignty. Besides defending the sovereignty of the nation, the Public Force defends the nation's territorial integrity and constitutional order. In order to achieve this, the Armed Forces have to provide security throughout the country to allow the governmental institutions to provide their services to the population. If these interagency organizations cannot have the necessary security to execute their mandates because of instability, the Armed Forces must ensure the integrity and constitutional order in the country.
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Another constitutional Article of interest is Article 250. This Article states in its second paragraph:
To combat terrorism and crimes against public security, and in the locations of the country where there is no judicial authority which may come immediately or where the access of ordinary judicial police officers is not possible for exceptional circumstances of public order, the Attorney General's Office will form special units of the Judicial Police with members of the Armed Forces under his direction and coordination. For the development of work specific to this function, members of the unit belonging to the Armed Forces shall be governed, without exception, by the same principles of responsibility as other members of the special unit.
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The importance of Article 250 is that for judicial purposes, the constitution provides a framework to develop interagency partnerships to ensure the reach of the judicial branch throughout the country. It provides a framework that allows the creation of special units to provide justice throughout the country and is a legal basis to constitute other interagency teams not limited to judicial missions but to provide the services required to ensure the integrity and constitutional order in the country.
11 Ibid, 67. 12 Ibid, 60.
Democratic Defense and Security Policy
The analysis of this policy is partially borrowed from the author's thesis "Colombian shelter and economic development and provide basic service to all regions of the country.
14 The second strategic objective was population protection. Without security, there cannot be economic development. In order to achieve this objective, the government supported the growth of the military, particularly its response capability. This meant not only increasing the number of soldiers but also procuring new equipment to gain the required flexibility to respond to emerging threats in a timely manner. In addition, the military and police forces focused on deploying a large number of units to safeguard lines of communication and key infrastructure.
Once the population felt safe to travel anywhere in Colombia, the economy and living standards began to improve.
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The third strategic objective was the elimination of the illicit drug trade in Colombia. To achieve this policy, the government established reward policies for those who gave information or to those who deserted the illegal organizations. This reward policy led to the capture of drug lords such as "Don Diego," the most important drug lord in Colombia. In addition, there has been increased international cooperation to find and target financing and trafficking networks. To ensure a higher interdiction capability along Colombian coasts and borders, the air and sea capacities of the Colombian Air Force and Navy Aviation had equipment and technology improvement. The fourth strategic objective was to maintain a dissuasive capacity. Once security was achieved in Colombia's internal regions, it became important to protect land, sea, and air sovereignty. This strategic objective focused on, but was not limited to, external threats. By maintaining a dissuasive capacity, the government may be able to focus on meeting the population needs rather than focusing on external threats. To accomplish these priorities, the President established the fifth objective: efficiency and transparency. This objective supports confidence in the government and its military and police forces. Transparency in all activities would legitimize the use of the military force and the correct employment of national and international resources. It had to ensure efficiency in order to be able to achieve all the objectives with the resources available and according to the population's needs and the government's goals.
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The DDSP is important because it connects all of the state agencies and institutions towards a common goal, which is to defeat terrorism. This common goal established within the 15 Uribe, "Democratic Defense and Security Policy," 32. 16 Ibid, 33.
presidential policy constitutes a first step for the creation of interagency teams to reach the farthest regions of Colombia and meet their needs.
Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security
As The first strategic objective of the DDSP was to consolidate territorial control and strengthen the rule of law across the entire nation. When the military and police forces established territorial control and security, the judicial branch and all other government institutions were able to reach those territories. The government, through its institutions, ensured the accomplishment of all goals and the free exercise of citizens' rights. In order to achieve this objective, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) developed a territorial control strategy that focused on ensuring the presence of security elements across the country. In addition, MOD developed an integrated action doctrine to coordinate and synchronize all of the actions of government and military institutions in Colombia.
and similar to the DDSP, established five strategic objectives.
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17 Correa, "Colombian Strategies and Operational Concepts Used in Today's Counterterrorism Warfare," 28. 18 Santos, "Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security," 5. 19 Ibid, 29.
The second objective was to protect the public and maintain the strategic initiative against all threats to national security. This was an offensive objective focused on locating and neutralizing all illegal elements in the society. It focused on population security and building confidence in national institutions. Through military offensive operations, the government attempted to reduce the strength of illegal organizations including terrorist organizations, drug cartels and organized crime organizations.
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The third objective was to increase the cost of trafficking drugs in Colombia. Military and police forces would use specialized units to attack and destroy the entire drug trafficking network's supply chain. Eradication of illicit crops with the support of the farmers was the initial effort. Interdiction supported this eradication strategy, not only of the drug itself, but also of materials needed to process it. Reinforcing territorial control to deter the growth of new illicit crops and the neutralization of illegal armed groups and drug trafficking structures reduced the cartel and independent trafficker's capability, allowing the government to reduce drug production and trafficking.
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The fourth objective was to keep public security forces modern and effective, with a high level of legitimacy based on public confidence and support. Special investments increased military and police capabilities. The goal was to increase mobility, intelligence capabilities, and establish a standing force with increased combat capabilities to search and destroy terrorist organization's leadership and lines of communications.
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The last objective of the PCDS was to maintain the downward trend in all crime rates in the country's urban centers. Since Colombia has a large urban society, significant efforts have been made to ensure the security of the population. The main effort to achieve this security was through the National Police. Because of the DDSP, by 2004, the National Police had already established police stations in all of the 1,099 municipalities of Colombia.
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As depicted in the introductory chapter, The PCDS has three phases differentiated according to the threat as depicted in the. The first one was the territorial control phase. This phase implemented and oriented towards the zones where illegal armed groups, drug trafficking structures or criminal bands were still active required a strong military presence. It is an offensive-oriented phase developed to neutralize criminal organizations and break up drug trafficking networks in order to achieve total control of an area denying the threat any ability to conduct attacks against the population, infrastructure and institutions. Once achieved this level of control of the Public Force, the Armed Forces could transition to the second phase, the stabilization phase. The process of institutional recovery was intended to begin with state democratic institutions and agencies satisfying the local population's needs under the military protection. Once achieved the required level of security and the constitutional institutions and agencies were in place, the Armed Forces could transition to the last phase of this strategy, the consolidation phase. During this phase, the Public Force was to continue to provide security in the regions while the constitutional institutions provided assistance and development with the political, economic, and social elements of national power.
The Colombian Army developed organizational strategy according to these phases dividing the territory into different types of regions following a "traffic light" pattern. The organization of the units would vary in each region especially in the type of soldiers employed to conduct different missions. In the Colombian Army, there are three different types of soldiers.
23 Ibid, 15. "Regular Soldiers" are those that upon turning eighteen years old are called to service in the Army for a compulsory period of twelve months for high school graduates or eighteen months for non-high school graduates. "Hometown Soldiers," are drafted from rural towns with the mission to serve in a platoon located in their hometown to protect it and support the police force.
They are very useful because of their knowledge of the region and its habitants. The last types of soldiers are the Professional Soldiers. After completing their mandatory service as "Regular Soldiers" or as "Hometown Soldiers," the soldiers decide if they want to continue their service for a prolonged time. These soldiers may remain in service up to twenty years and are thus considered "Professional". In the traffic pattern strategy, the first type of region considered as "red," corresponds to the territorial control phase of the policy. In these "red" areas, the Army is operating with approximately 75% of its force consisting on professional soldiers organized in
Counter-Guerilla Battalions and Mobile Brigades and 25% consisting on regular soldiers and Hometown Soldiers organized in territorial units. Mobile and Counter -Guerrilla units are light infantry units with small staffs that were deployable anywhere in the territory without special infrastructure needed. These special units executed offensive operations against all threats in the region while the remaining 25% of forces consisting of "regular soldiers" conducted defensive operations, particularly guarding urban centers and infrastructure.
The second type of region considered as "yellow" is related to the stabilization phase. In this type of region, the Army conducts operations on a 50% basis. This mean that half of the soldiers deployed in this region are "professional soldiers" and the other half are a mix of "regular soldiers" and "Hometown Soldiers". Professional soldiers conduct offensive operations against the remainder of terrorist and drug-trafficking networks while the regular soldiers and Hometown Soldiers conduct defensive operations by providing security in controlled areas. The final type of regions is "green" and may be related to the consolidation phase of the strategy. In these types of regions, 75% of the Army's forces, consisting of regular soldiers, conduct operations to provide urban and infrastructure protection while the remaining 25% of the effort, consisting of the professional force continue executing offensive operations in critical areas and any remaining illegal structures.
All phases established in this policy were important for establishing security and stability throughout the country; however, the second, or stabilization, phase provides the impetus for establishing an effective stability operations doctrine in the Colombian Army. It is this phase, which focuses military efforts on supporting regional development through offensive and defensive actions conducted in concert with inter-governmental stability operations. This phase highlights the need for developing stability operations in Colombian Army doctrine in order to be able to synchronize the efforts of different agencies and institutions.
Legal Considerations Analysis
The involved in an intervention: security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian and social wellbeing, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure. full spectrum operations in Iraq for more than seven years, to include stability operations.
Because it is a current operation reinforced by prior experiences, U.S. stability operations in Iraq are the most important to be analyzed for the purpose of the monograph, and will be the focus of the analysis of U.S. experiences. establishing an economic framework during the initial stages of post-conflict operations to facilitate reconstruction and economic recovery efforts in order to achieve lasting results.
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In chapter three of his monograph, Colonel Clay argues that stability operations involve both coercive and cooperative measures and include actions to establish a safe and secure environment, provide or help facilitate the provision of essential basic services, reconstruct key infrastructure, and provide humanitarian relief in order to enable the transition to legitimate, local civil governance. The main objective of stability operations is to set the conditions that will enable a government to provide for its own security, rule of law, basic services, and economic prosperity. An important issue that the author highlights is the importance of beginning the planning of post-conflict operations in parallel with combat operations. The commander must develop a vision of the environment after combat operations are over as well as how to transition to a stable local government. The lack of envisioning stability operations prior to the operation will create a gap in transition and as result could give opportunity for new threats to emerge in the region because of the lack of governance or security. Conducting stability operations is a complex task because every region is different in its cultural context. Another important issue is establishing or maintaining local leadership during stability operations. Through ensuring a local face on operations, the military force gains trust and support from the local population to reduce the friction between the military, state agencies, and the local population.
Stability operations must include effective planning and coordination between the military and the interagency throughout all phases of operations in order to set the conditions for successful reconstruction and economic recovery operations.
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The U.S. Army with its experience has learned that stability operations are not only a military effort. To effectively conduct stability operations the military have to be able to transfer the responsibility to civilian institutions (See fig 5) . Some "phases" could guide the transition from military to civilian responsibility as seen in Iraq, stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction. Stabilization involves all military and civilian activities conducted to prevent or halt the deterioration of security and the existing systems while setting conditions for further phases. Security involves the development a secure environment not only for the local population
As stated before, stability operations must be planned in conjunction with combat operations. This planning must be accomplished in coordination with the local and national organizations and institutions.
48 Ibid, 3. but also for the military and organizations involved in different activities or operations in the region. Transition involves the shifting the lead responsibility from the military to civilian organizations to establish essential services, economic development and political governance.
Finally, Reconstruction is the process of rebuilding the political, socioeconomic and physical infrastructure of a country or territory. This is likely to be a civilian-led effort and includes addressing the root causes of the conflict to achieve sustainable peace. employed or failed to employ some type of stability operations with and without coordination with government agencies.
Colombian experiences
The book where all political and military actions against the Colombian government were planned, ordered and controlled. The FARC knew the political necessity of this sanctuary but were confident that government forces were never going to attack it. As Jacobo Arenas (the most important ideological and political leader in FARC history) used to say: "Casa Verde is a myth, a legend and therefore has allies and it is hated. There are reactionaries that in their delirium would like to see it destroyed, but they will fail because it is not anymore the mystic cabin lost in the jungles of the oriental mountain chain."
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Just as in 1990, this operation was a military success. The Army occupied the former political and military sanctuary and the FARC had to retreat to other jungle areas of Colombia. It was such a military success that this terrorist group has never again been able again to establish a sanctuary inside of Colombian territory. Unfortunately, the lack of stability operations by government agencies to redevelop the region allowed the region to once again fall under the influence of the FARC. Although government forces continue to conduct operations in this area, it is still a strategic corridor for the FARC. stability doctrine is the best model to follow, as it has evolved from practical experience.
Analysis of Historical U. S. and Colombian Stability Operations Experiences
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
Colombian Armed Forces should conduct stability operations as part of its internal operations against terrorist groups.
The primary purpose of the Colombian Armed Forces is the defense of sovereignty, independence, national territorial integrity and constitutional order." those regions, the population will be able to be self-sufficient and produce an adequate standard of living. In addition, the economic development must be oriented to develop the required infrastructure to meet the basic needs. The institutions of the social element of national power should focus in developing a sustainable health and education systems. The political element of national power should ensure a democratic and stable government with equal opportunities to all political parties. These and other activities developed by the military, economic, politic and social elements of national power conducted as part of stability operations will ensure Colombian success in the war against internal terrorism and will ensure a long term peace.
Recommendations
Colombian Army doctrine must provide enough flexibility to adapt to different types of warfare and levels of war by adopting U. S. Full Spectrum Operations doctrine to support interagency efforts towards a long-standing peace. As described in U.S. Army doctrine, full spectrum operations simultaneously combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations. Modern warfare is dynamic. In the same theater, a military commander may employ different types of operations simultaneously to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. These synchronized operations may employ lethal and nonlethal activities proportional to the mission.
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Even though the Colombian conflict is ongoing, it is also valid that in some regions the reduced threat has a local criminal behavior. In these regions, the Army, along with other state agencies, should begin to conduct stability operations to help to build strong local environments that may prevent or deter the development of new insurgent or terrorist elements. By doing this the Armed Forces will focus their offensive capabilities in those regions where the threat is still high.
Colombian doctrine covers offensive and defensive operations, but does not describe stability operations.
Colombian military forces must acquire the capability and training required to perform stability operations, both alone and in coordination with other governmental agencies. The 
